This discussion has placed industry at the centre of our national innovation system. I would indeed propose that any vibrant national innovation system begins with firm competitiveness. That is why India’s attempts to build technical capability through heavy investments in public R&D well ahead of most developing countries in the 1950s, 60s and 70s came to nought. There is much we can learn from the experience of the most successful economic development stories of the last 70 years — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China. Each followed a particular sequence in building innovation capacity. Firms first entered export markets as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) supplying to foreign brands. This ensured world-scale capacity and was by definition internationally competitive. These industries were usually labour-intensive and low-technology — garments, footwear, food processing. The next step was a move up the value chain to more technology-intensive sectors — consumer durables, electronic assembly, automobiles and parts, and chemical intermediates. As firms entered these sectors, they also started to invest in in-house R&D to sustain competitiveness in the long run. A later move to higher-technology sectors — semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, computers — went with increasing investments in in-house R&D. The growth of industrial R&D demanded more sophisticated research talent. Whether by design or happy accident, all five East Asian governments responded by growing their investments in publicly funded R&D and, crucially, followed the successful example of the West in locating this public research in the higher education system. The net effect was that this public research was fruitful, not because it was of much value in itself, but because excellent researchers got trained in the education system as a by-product. These researchers became the core of the increasingly sophisticated in-house R&D departments of local firms. This sequence of a competitive industry followed by deepening technical sophistication followed by in-house R&D followed by public research is my reading of the economic history of these countries. I’ve painted it broad-brush, drawing on what another pioneering economist of innovation, Keith Pavitt, argued some decades ago — albeit with the nuance of a good academic.
Now consider India. Only after our 1991 liberalisation was competitiveness forced on Indian industry, placing it on the first step of the innovation sequence. The next step hasn’t happened in any broad sense. As we saw earlier, Indian industry has been content with low R&D spending of 0.3 per cent of GDP, compared with the world’s 1.5 per cent. But some sectors have moved ahead. Among the 10 key technology-intensive sectors that dominate global industrial R&D, India has some presence in two — pharmaceuticals and automobiles. The pharmaceutical industry may have no presence in the league table of our most profitable firms, but it dominates the league table of our top R&D investors. With 41 of the top 100 R&D spenders, pharmaceuticals accounts for 34 per cent of all Indian industrial R&D. At 10 per cent of sales, R&D intensity is lower than the world’s 16 per cent, but this ratio is decent relative to every other sector. Our best chance of building a world-class innovative industry is in pharmaceuticals. What must we do to get there? What must industry do? And what call does this place on the wider innovation ecosystem — on public research, R&D incentives, and a regulatory system that supports innovation? That will be Part-II of this article.