The aftermath of Operation Sindoor—India’s swift and precision-guided missile offensive against terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir in May 2025—has catalysed an intense internal debate over the creation of an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF).The operation’s success, characterised by the effective use of BrahMos cruise missiles and other indigenous precision munitions, has thrust questions of centralised missile command.
Strategic Trigger: Post-Conflict Realities And Regional Escalation
Operation Sindoor marked a strategic shift; it was not only a punitive strike in response to terrorism but a demonstration of Indian missile capabilities independent of foreign platforms and logistics. The campaign showcased the decisive role of missiles such as the BrahMos—employed jointly by the Army, Air Force, and Navy—and revealed gaps in Pakistan's and, by extension, China's air defence systems.
Concurrently, Pakistan responded by announcing the creation of an Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), openly modelled on China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The ARFC consolidates Pakistan’s missile assets for conventional conflict, heightening the sense of a regional “missile arms race” and tilting strategic stability toward greater escalation potential.
The Rationale: Why An Indian Rocket Force Now?
India currently maintains its major missile assets—BrahMos, Prithvi, Pralay, the evolving BM-04, and the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher—across the three services. This siloed distribution leads to operational fragmentation, slower decision cycles, and inefficiencies in both crisis and peacetime deterrence. In the context of Pakistan and China consolidating their own rocket forces under unified commands, Indian strategic circles argue for a centralised, joint-service Rocket Force that would:
Unify land, air, and naval missile assets for integrated command and rapid response
Enable escalation management by having distinct control over strategic, theatre, and tactical missile assets
Enhance deterrence by providing a clear and credible conventional counterforce
Improve cost-effectiveness and doctrinal clarity by reducing redundancy and streamlining procurement and development
Jointness And Integration
The central question is whether an Indian rocket force would be a joint service organisation—mirroring the emerging “Theaterisation” reforms underway in the Indian armed forces. Under current considerations, the proposed IRF is envisioned as a tri-service command under the stewardship of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), likely headed operationally by a Lieutenant General-equivalent, integrating inputs and operational control from all three traditional services.
Tactical Vs Strategic Asset Control
Debate persists over the demarcation of missile assets: which missiles remain with the services for “tactical” use (e.g., Pinaka, short-range Prithvi), and which are delegated to the IRF for broader, theatre-level “strategic” effect (e.g., BrahMos, Pralay, BM-04). The Pralay missile, with its newly tested 500 km range and advanced maneuverability, and the next-generation BM-04 (up to 1,500 km), exemplify the blurring of lines between tactical and strategic systems. The Pinaka system itself is evolving, with new variants extending to 120 km and even a planned 300 km range, raising questions on classification and centralised control.
Integration With Broader Defence Architecture
The Indian debate is evolving in tandem with the recently announced Sudarshan Chakra Mission, which aims to combine the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) with an integrated, indigenous rocket force capable of both air defence and precision counter strikes—akin to Israel’s Iron Dome but with a distinctly offensive dimension. This integration is designed to create seamless, real-time operational networks for “non-contact” warfare, offering both defensive and offensive reach across domains.
Transition Challenges And Ongoing Discussion
Major institutional changes—including transfer of assets, revised operational doctrines, new command structures, and alignment with jointness reforms—will be necessary. Realignment will affect procurement, training, and the development of interoperable C4ISR systems. There are ongoing strategic, doctrinal, and bureaucratic debates over jurisdiction, interoperability, and peacetime versus wartime operational control. The possibility of friction exists as entrenched service cultures and interests adjust to a highly integrated, joint-command paradigm.,...
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15 min 
August 27, 2025
 "India's Rocket Force Debate Intensifies After Operation Sindoor: Structure, Jointness")
