The Taliban factor

India's outreach remains an open question

The returning Taliban regime recently completed one year of rule in Afghanistan by spectacularly contradicting all the naïve hopes the Western powers had invested in it. Like its extremist predecessor, which ruled from 1996 to October 2001, the 2.0 version has proven just as implacable in establishing its warped version of Sharia law that overrides human rights and oppresses women. As Afghanistan’s democratically elected regimes discovered, rebuilding a country ruined by decades of war and lacking basic institutions of governance is a tough ask, even with material support from the US. The Taliban, which remains a guerrilla group that lacks a constructive governing system beyond imposing its vague notion of an eighth century Islamic state, is unlikely to be skilled in the art of state building. Nor does it, on current record, show any inclination in this direction.

This being the case, the problem for India has expanded manifold in terms of establishing diplomatic ties. After gratuitous attacks on Indians in Afghanistan prompted India to close its embassy and withdraw all personnel, New Delhi had signalled rapprochement by reopening its embassy in Kabul 10 months later in June, becoming the 15th nation to do so at the time. The Indian foreign ministry’s explanation for doing so was to closely monitor and coordinate the humanitarian assistance there. India has long enjoyed a benign reputation in Afghanistan because of its traditional developmental role in that country. This position has been complicated by the fact that the Taliban is a Pakistani client, and India had supported the opposition alliance against Taliban 1.0. New Delhi now sees an opportunity in forging more durable ties, given the manifest tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. This has been evident in the Taliban’s refusal to accede to a Pakistani government request to surrender Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan elements sheltering across the border. Reportedly Islamabad’s irritation on this key issue is one reason it chose to inform the US about al Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri’s whereabouts.

Af-Pak tensions, however, are unlikely to materially alter the self-interested dynamic between the two countries for the simple reason that their geo-strategic realities converge when it comes to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The fact that the Taliban was discovered to be sheltering al-Zawahiri, who was recently killed by the US, and that a branch of the Islamic State attacked a gurdwara in Kabul only underline concerns that Afghanistan had become an assembly point for sundry extremist Islamic terror groups in need of employment. But this conveyor belt of terrorists, however damaging to the region, complements Pakistan’s disruptive 75-year territorial aims in the region. This much can be seen in the upsurge in terrorist activity along the border and reports of growing recruitment among disaffected youth in J&K to the extremist cause. Ironically, the reading down of Articles 370 and 35A, which gave J&K its special status, and the imposition of direct rule from New Delhi have not changed objective conditions on the ground in this troubled region. This makes managing diplomatic relations with the Taliban tricky, forcing India to steer a narrow course between humanitarian benevolence and military aggression. At any rate, India should not fall into the Western trap of expecting a kinder, gentler regime in Kabul.