India at 75: The Executive tops the list of worst-performing institutions

There is an "us vs them" approach to governance that has permeated all the services that constitute the Executive

This is the fourth in a six-part series on how institutions—Constitution, Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, RBI and Concluding article—have worked since independence. This series will appear on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays in the run-up to 75th Independence Day on August 15. Part 1 Part 2 Part 3

As in other democracies, the executive part of the government has two branches: the administrative and the political. Over the last 75 years, both have done badly, but the administrative arm has done worse. So, let’s discuss it first.

In the late 1780s, the East India Company started building a formal administrative system for the governance of India. It had two broad objectives in mind: facilitating the making of money and ensuring that the Indians didn’t rebel. Since a large proportion of its money was made from land revenue, it devised a system of revenue administration and entrusted it to a bunch of British boys in their twenties.

They kept the ‘natives’ under control with the help of the army. In 1860 they became members of the Indian Civil Service (ICS). In 1861 another service, the Imperial Police Service (IPS).  After independence in 1947, the ICS became the IAS. The IPS retained its letters, but Imperial became Indian. 

And this is the real story of the failure of the executive in the last 75 years. It is the only institution which, compared to the other institutions, has failed more because it has remained essentially colonial in outlook.

It has an “us vs them” approach to governance, and this approach has also permeated the various services that now constitute the Executive. Members of these services see themselves as rulers rather than providers of a service to the people.

The executive branches of government offer generous pay, allowances, benefits, pensions, and some extraordinary privileges. Yet, government employees are completely unaccountable to anyone, largely because of a provision in the Constitution, Article 311. This article gives them immunity from dismissal in all but cases of madness and moral turpitude. Incompetence is not a ground for removal from service.

There have been several attempts to reform these services. They have failed because the incentive structure is completely wrong. Most members of these services have no skin in the game. Public service is very far from their minds.

There is, nevertheless, a vulnerability because the ministers can make life very difficult for them on a personal level. The most popular instrument is the power of transfer. This is the Damocles sword that has transformed the executive branch from one intended to serve the people to one that serves the ministers. The result is a highly collusive Executive.

Simultaneously, politically large and powerful pressure groups have succeeded in diluting the criteria for admission into these services. The expansion of the quota system in the last 75 years has resulted in an overall diminution in commitment and competence. Just the fact of entry into a government job is seen as a triumph that should last for life. There is no compulsion to perform.

This led Rajiv Gandhi to make a rueful admission in 1987. In response to a question about the difference between being a pilot and a prime minister, he told Time magazine that when he gave a command as a pilot, the aircraft instantly obeyed. But as prime minister, he had no idea what happened to his orders. Those below him couldn’t care less that the prime minister wanted something done.

Things haven’t been much better for the political arm of the executive. Here the bigger problem lies in the states. The central government has done better, not least because it helps itself to the better officers but also because the states have sacrificed quality for the quantity of their employees. That’s the political imperative to create government jobs.

Another problem with the political side lies in the absence, even 75 years after independence, of minimum educational criteria for being elected to the legislature. This has abridged the set of legislators that can be appointed as ministers. But literacy aside, too many ministers lack the competence to do justice to their jobs. This problem is especially pronounced at the state level, where many important policies, such as infrastructure, health care and education, have to be executed.

One more intractable problem in the Executive is ministerial and bureaucratic corruption. The colonial system was based on seeking permission for almost everything a citizen needed. This has created a premium not only on getting the permissions but also on speed. Bureaucratic discretion is exercised in the unkindest manner possible. Not to put too fine a point on it, the last 75 years have spawned a predatory and dysfunctional system.

Another highly discomfiting tendency that emerged in 1973 — when the Criminal Procedure Code was amended to give the police executive authority — is the gradual increase in the dependence of the political side on the police. This dependence has grown because of several reasons. But none of these seem justified.

In a nutshell, if a ranking was made of which institution has performed the worst, the Executive would easily top the list.