The India-Pakistan hyphen disappeared in 1999 and hasn't returned

With time having clarified much of the disinformation surrounding Operation Sindoor, and early analyses now exhausted, India’s last High Commissioner to Pakistan and later envoy to Canada, Ajay Bisaria, speaks about apprehensions of an India-Pakistan rehyphenation, the role diplomacy can play in cementing battlefield gains, and what might lie ahead with China. 

With Operation Sindoor paused, who emerged as winners and losers?

This conflict played out across three domains: military foremost but also diplomatic and informational. In the military domain, India clearly had a battlefield advantage and dominated not just the conflict itself but also the escalation ladder. At each stage, India pushed the battle up a rung, then offered an off-ramp for de-escalation, which Pakistan eventually took on May 10. It was an overwhelming military victory for India, despite Pakistan also claiming victory, as it always does. Anything short of a crushing defeat is portrayed by Pakistan as success. In the diplomatic domain, India’s strategy worked well. Military action drove the engagement, while diplomacy supported and facilitated a kinetic response to cross-border terror. India gained significant global traction from the outset first in terms of support for punishing terrorism, and later for its cross-border kinetic action deep into another country’s territory. The only global caveat was the call to de-escalate after escalation. Post-conflict diplomacy is now visible through all-party delegations. In the information domain, the outcome is more clouded. India arguably underperformed, as Pakistan typically seizes the advantage of the first lie rushing into the information space with disinformation, while India waits for verification. Compounding this was the poor performance of Indian electronic media, which spread incorrect information. This highlights the need to strengthen strategic communication and war reporting.

Apprehensions have emerged in India that it has been re-hyphenated with Pakistan, and that Kashmir has been internationalised...

Neither of these concerns hyphenation or internationalisation have materialised. That was early, lazy analysis. The US role here was no different from its position after the 2019 Balakot airstrike. The only change is Trump 2.0, a different figure from Trump 1.0 who was in office in 2019. The outcome clearly stemmed from India’s military pressure on Pakistan, especially on the night of May 9–10, which forced Pakistan to climb down there’s no doubt about that. What’s different now is that Trump’s social media post appeared around 5:35 pm, before Pakistan claimed a ceasefire and well before India’s official announcement. This reflects Trump’s tendency not necessarily his administration’s to insert himself into situations and claim quick victories, especially when there was no breakthrough in Gaza, Ukraine, or with China on tariffs. This seemed like a 

low-hanging fruit. At that point, Trump did not represent the official US position, or even that of his own administration. It was simply Trump being Trump. Policy circles recognised this, which is why there was no serious pushback just a reiteration of India’s position that the pause was the result of a bilateral agreement. Other global actors, including Saudi Arabia, may have reinforced India’s message to Pakistan and acted as supplementary channels but certainly not the primary one. The same happened in 2019, though without public credit-claiming. On the broader point of hyphenation: The India–Pakistan hyphen disappeared in 1999 and hasn’t returned. Media mentions of both countries in the same breath don’t amount to hyphenation. A hyphen implies the false equivalence common in the 1990s. That ended on July 4, 1999, when President Clinton summoned Nawaz Sharif to the White House and backed India’s coercive diplomacy, telling him to withdraw from Kargil or face consequences. Since then, given the trajectory of India–US ties, the hyphen has remained absent. Washington understands the difference between a $300 billion economy and a $4 trillion one; between a responsible democracy and a state that exports terrorism. That distinction is clear in US thinking and not just in Washington, but across the West. As for internationalisation, this isn’t about Kashmir it’s about terrorism. India’s delegations abroad are focused on communicating the new normal: Zero tolerance for terrorism. Their message is that Pakistan’s actions must be addressed collectively.