Why India's defence-industrial ecosystem remains in the State's hands

The post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was formally created in December 2019, with the appointment of General Bipin Rawat as the first CDS. The necessity of a CDS had been first mooted as a recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee led by K Subrahmanyam after the 1999 Kargil War to address the issue of the lack of jointness among the three Services. Subsequently, in 2001, a Group of Ministers report reiterated the need for a CDS to ensure better coordination and integration among the armed forces. However, this major reform was kept in abeyance by successive governments until 2019, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced it from the ramparts of the Red Fort in his Independence Day address. Of the many roles and responsibilities assigned to the CDS, the most important one was to foster jointness among the three services, a responsibility outlined in the Cabinet’s 2019 notification. This included promoting integration in operations, logistics, training, and staffing, with a specific focus on facilitating the establishment of joint and theatre commands [emphasis added].  General Bipin Rawat took this responsibility extremely seriously and, within a short span of time, outlined a broad framework on the possible contours of theatre commands in the sub-continental context. Even while these deliberations were ongoing, and still at the conceptual level, there were many voices within the country questioning the very need for theatre commands. This was a very regressive and status quoist outlook, not in keeping with the changing character of war. These commentators pointed out how the existing system had worked well in the past, with little thought to the fact that future wars will be fought in a different environment and circumstances. A brief look at the recent military operations will highlight this aspect.  The military activities that were undertaken as part of Operation Sindoor covered the entire Western front with Pakistan, from the mountainous terrain of J&K to the plains of Punjab, deserts of Rajasthan and marshes of Gujarat. Addressing this were the Army’s Northern, Western, South-Western and Southern Commands; and the Air Force’s Western and South-Western Air Commands. The drone and aerial attacks by Pakistan all across the Western front were contained with minimal damage, within the resources of each of the commands. But what if the situation had escalated, with any one of the commands bearing the brunt of the attacks, requiring the inter-command movement of forces? Would any of the army or air force commanders have had the picture of the entire Western Front and where the criticality lay? More importantly, would any of them have parted with any of their resources when themselves under attack? If anything, the current incident and the response thereto have only reinforced the need for theatre commands.  What shape these theatre commands should take and the systemic or organisational changes stemming from this transformation have been the subject of much debate over the last few years, ever since General Rawat had outlined his proposal, in the first half of 2020, of two land-based operational theatre commands, an operational maritime theatre command and a functional integrated air defence theatre command. The thought process behind this was of one theatre looking after one front/threat, be it the western and northern land borders, and one maritime theatre looking after the entire gamut of sea-borne threats. The air defence command was to be a functional command coordinating the ‘raise train and sustain’ functions of the three services, while the operational control of the assets would be retained by the theatres. Although much work had been done on these formulations, including a plan for rolling them out in a phased manner over a period of two years, starting from about January 2022, it suffered a setback due to General Bipin Rawat’s tragic demise in a helicopter crash in December 2021. It then fell on to General Anil Chauhan, who was appointed the CDS in the latter half of 2022, to take this work forward.  In his recently released book, “Ready, Relevant and Resurgent: A Blueprint for the Transformation of India’s Military”, General Anil Chauhan has outlined his vision for reshaping India’s armed forces through jointness, indigenisation and integrated theatre commands, as envisaged in the charter of the CDS. The broad outline of the theatres remains more or less as what was originally envisaged, namely three geographical and one functional commands, the exact configurations of which have not yet been made public. A formal declaration in this regard is expected by the end of the year.  One key distinction, however, is that of operational control. In the original Cabinet note of 2019, the CDS had no operational role, which remained with the three chiefs. This aspect has been the focus of discussion for a long time, even before the creation of the office of the CDS. In most countries following the theatre command system, it is the theatre commander who exercises operational command and control over all the tri-service forces placed at his disposal, while the service chiefs are then only responsible for the ‘raise, train and sustain’ functions. These are what General Anil Chauhan refers to as the ‘Force Application’ and ‘Force Generation’ functions, respectively. Moreover, as and when Theatre HQ come into being, interposing yet another layer between the existing Command HQ and Service HQ, to the decision-making loop, does not really make sense, given the dynamic and fast-paced nature of contemporary warfare. Equally, the current role of the CDS as a single-point advisor without direct operational command may require reconsideration to effectively implement the theatre command structure.  Preferably, then, the corps commanders (and operational equivalents) should report on operational matters directly to the theatre commander / HQ (not the army commander) and then on to the CDS, and on administrative matters to the army commanders (and equivalent) and then through to the respective service chiefs. This kind of arrangement, albeit at a much lower scale, works well with respect to the Assam Rifles, which come under the Ministry of Home Affairs for administrative purposes, but exclusively under the army for operational matters; two parallel chains of command working harmoniously. Since the theatre commander would have to exercise command over the assets of all three services assigned to the theatre, he/ she should also be of four-star rank at par with the service chiefs. Apropos, the CDS should be a five-star general.  The transition to theatre commands is not going to happen overnight and will come with its own set of challenges, including the need to harmonise the distinct cultures and operational doctrines of the three services. Even after formal orders are issued, it will take a few years to undertake the necessary organisational changes and hand over operational charge to the theatres. A phased transition, one theatre at a time, will be the most practical, keeping in mind the ever-present threat on our borders.  General M M Naravane is a retired Indian Army general who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.