'The US has imposed 50 per cent tariffs on Indian goods. Even as trade talks have resumed, what do you think will be the implications of this on India’s strategic relations with the US in defence, technology, and Indo-Pacific cooperation?
We have, in fact, been virtually singled out. Even China has only 30 per cent. What is surprising is that we had already gone through five rounds of negotiations, and a post-trade deal was submitted for (US President Donald) Trump’s approval. His rhetoric has consistently been that India must make very significant concessions in areas where domestic lobbies resist.
After decades of careful diplomacy, it is insulting that the relationship is strained in such a manner. Some officials even expect India to apologise for positions taken in our national interest.
The Prime Minister has responded positively, underlining the US as a natural partner with limitless potential. The broader aim is to avoid negative consequences, such as rising racial sentiment against Indians and potential dampening of investments.
Trump’s unpredictable nature often treats uncertainty as an asset, forcing interlocutors to make concessions. India has remained firm. The Prime Minister has refused unnecessary concessions, and there is no indication that the punitive tariffs will be lifted. Negotiations continue with these tariffs in place, which complicates dialogue.
Reports suggest that discussions on tariffs with China are ongoing. While Trump has shown relative softness towards China, his pursuit of a “big, beautiful deal” has not been mirrored with India. This atmosphere of unpredictability colours every diplomatic engagement.
In this light, do you think the tariff episode could prompt India to move closer to Russia or China strategically?
India does not see itself merely as a strategic element in the US-China competition. We are an independent, sovereign country and will decide to what extent we confront or engage China. The US, on the other hand, cannot disentangle itself from China economically or militarily. Its largest partner is China, and this relationship encompasses vast commercial and strategic dimensions.
Our threat assessment is different. China represents a direct threat to India, both militarily and economically. The US, while a major power, faces no direct threat from China on its own soil. Therefore, while India engages with the US, it must simultaneously engage with China to manage regional security, economic interests, and strategic stability.
India has developed policies to engage China while simultaneously building partnerships with the US. We work with European nations, such as France and Germany, in maritime and Indo-Pacific strategies, recognising India’s indispensable role in the region. India is not a pawn in anyone’s strategic calculations; our foreign policy remains sovereign and pragmatic.
Traditionally, the US has regarded India as a bulwark against China. Do you think that this particular tariff episode could trigger India to move closer to Russia and China?
I know this is frequently stated — that the US looks at India. But we do not see ourselves merely as an element in the strategic calculations of the US against China.
The prediction you mentioned, in terms of American trust towards India, overlooks the fact that the biggest partner for the US is China. Their relationship is extremely strong; it cannot be delinked. Just look at the number of US companies operating in China. Additionally, the US has a serious military and strategic interest in keeping China engaged.
The same considerations apply to us. China is a direct threat to India, not to the continental US. Physically, they are a massive military and economic power on our borders. If the US cannot delink itself from China, how can we expect ourselves to delink from China? Consequently, our trade with China continues, and we maintain a dual policy — both engaging China and simultaneously developing partnerships with the US.
Moreover, beyond the bilateral level, in France we have very functional cooperation in maritime security, keeping the China threat in view. The European Union has its Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany has an Indo-Pacific strategy, and India features prominently in all these strategies because of our strategic dominance in the Indian Ocean. No other navy, apart from the US Navy, has such reach in this space. India is indispensable.
Therefore, we are not a tool in anyone’s hands. We have a sovereign policy. We should engage China, team up where mutually beneficial, but also be prepared to put pressure on China when necessary.
To return to your point, the idea that the US sees India as a bulwark against China is commonly stated, but it does not reflect our priorities. Why should we position ourselves purely as a counterweight when we aim to cooperate with China? We pursue cooperation to the extent we share interests, particularly in deterrence, while also managing competition. For instance, in the Himalayas, China has its own interests and ambitions, and we are mindful of that in our bilateral interactions.
Currently, if we consider the three major powers — the US, China, and Russia — our stable relationship is most evident with Russia. With the US, we are beginning to face difficulties, though our relationship retains significant breadth and potential. It is important to note that while the US is a key partner, our relationships are not solely conditioned on Washington’s priorities.
Even in the case of Pakistan, consider President Trump’s unprecedented move to invite a foreign military chief to the White House. Historically, foreign military chiefs only visited after becoming presidents of their countries. This demonstrates that US engagement does not necessarily revolve around India, and we must approach such assumptions carefully.
Turning to Russia, how does India manage its strategic autonomy while maintaining strong ties with both the US and Russia?
Russia occupies a central place in India’s strategic matrix. Our relationship with Russia is stable, encompassing defence, energy, and investments. The US may exert pressure, but India must preserve strategic autonomy. Russia is essential for our defence capabilities and energy security. We have invested heavily in hydrocarbon projects in Russia, and further opportunities exist in the Russian Far East.
Despite external pressures, India maintains robust cooperation with Russia, including in the defence sector. We purchase discounted oil from Russia, and engage in trade and investment opportunities that serve our national interest. While the US seeks to influence these relationships, India carefully balances partnerships to ensure long-term strategic stability.
The ongoing Ukraine conflict demonstrates the complexities of this balancing act. India abstained from certain resolutions, maintaining diplomatic engagement with all parties. While Russia remains a close partner, India preserves flexibility and does not fully align with any single bloc. This ensures India’s independent decision-making in global affairs, consistent with our strategic priorities and national interest.
At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised border security as a key component of India-China relations. Do you think disagreements over the Line of Actual Control will continue to be a thorn in the progress of bilateral ties?
I do not foresee immediate resolution. China is extremely hard line on territorial issues, similar to its dealings with Japan. Consider Japan: despite being China’s second-largest economic partner, they have disputes over the Senkaku Islands, yet China offers no significant concessions. Likewise, China separates economic engagement from territorial disputes, as seen in the South China Sea with countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
For India, the approach must be pragmatic. The border dispute has historical legacies, but economic and strategic cooperation with China should continue. It is unacceptable to halt dialogue completely, and ongoing discussions through Special Representatives (SRs) are vital. Last year, President Xi (Jinping) and Prime Minister Modi reached some understanding, and the talks between our SRs indicate progress, although an “early harvest” strategy is misleading. A package deal is necessary rather than piecemeal agreements, ensuring de-escalation and de-induction before considering sectoral solutions.
How does India balance its ties with Israel, Iran, and the Arab world in the shifting West Asian order?
India maintains close, defence-oriented ties with Israel, leveraging their technological expertise. Recent visits by high-ranking Israeli politicians underscore the strategic importance of this relationship. Despite controversies surrounding certain figures, India has successfully engaged with Israel while maintaining broader regional relationships.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have not withdrawn diplomatic engagement, signalling continuity in ties. India also continues to support the Palestinian cause, advocating a two-state solution, while recognising pragmatic limitations. Foreign policy cannot be dictated solely by morality; strategic interests must guide engagement.
Iran, too, has not objected to India-Israel relations. India maintains positive relations with Iran, despite the adversarial stance Iran holds towards Israel. Statements from Tehran indicate a willingness to engage constructively with India, reflecting India’s careful balancing of interests in the Middle East.
If you had to identify three strategic priorities for India in the coming decade, what would they be? And what first steps should the government take to move in that direction?
The biggest strategic priority for India is building and demonstrating a successful posture. National relations are not sustained solely by soft power; they are grounded in hard power. Hard power stems from economic growth because it provides the resources to acquire defence capabilities, infrastructure, technological advancement, and strategic reach. Economic growth must remain robust. To close the gap with competitors such as China, we need sustained growth rates of 8–10 per cent, or at least 6–7 per cent. Without this, there is no real strategic autonomy.
The second priority is self-sufficiency in defence. We cannot aspire to be a great power unless we rely on ourselves for critical defence equipment and technology. Dependence on others is risky because suppliers may withhold critical materials or provide them to adversaries. The Ukraine conflict has shown that wars can be prolonged and unpredictable. Achieving indigenous capabilities ensures our strategic readiness is not compromised.
The third priority is strategic autonomy. It is built into India’s DNA to be an independent actor, not an appendage of any larger power. Even if we are not the strongest power globally, strategic autonomy ensures that we can pursue our interests without undue external influence. This autonomy allows India to engage, cooperate, or deter other powers according to our own calculations. It also provides the opportunity to play the role we deem appropriate on the global stage, based on our national interests and values.
These three priorities — economic strength, defence self-reliance, and strategic autonomy — are interconnected. Economic growth underpins defence and strategic capability. Defence self-reliance protects our sovereignty and strengthens bargaining power. Strategic autonomy ensures we remain independent in global affairs, able to engage with all countries while safeguarding our own interests.
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August 31, 2025
 "India is 'not a tool in anyone's hands' - BP Podcasrs")
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