India's defence spend has declined as a share of GDP and government expenditure Defence spending

India's defence spend has declined as a share of GDP and government expenditure, alongside a parallel drop in foreign acquisitions in capital defence purchases, The central question is whether .

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Updated On: Aug 19 2025 | 3:02 PM IST
Defence, S-400

US has not made a decision on any potential CAATSA waiver to India for the purchase of the S-400 missile defence system from Russia as India has started receiving the supply of the Defence system (Photo: ANI)

India’s defence spending, as a percentage of the GDP has decreased from 2.25 per cent in 2014-15 to 1.91 per cent in 2024-2025. Along with this, there has also been a drop in the share of foreign procurement in capital defence purchases, especially from 2018-19 onwards, with share of foreign procurement being at approximately 49 per cent in 2018-19 declining by more than half at 12.4 per cent in the previous financial year uptil December 2024. 
The Rationale: Why An Indian Rocket Force Now?
 
India currently maintains its major missile assets—BrahMos, Prithvi, Pralay, the evolving BM-04, and the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher—across the three services. This siloed distribution leads to operational fragmentation, slower decision cycles, and inefficiencies in both crisis and peacetime deterrence. In the context of Pakistan and China consolidating their own rocket forces under unified commands, Indian strategic circles argue for a centralised, joint-service Rocket Force that would:
 
Unify land, air, and naval missile assets for integrated command and rapid response
Enable escalation management by having distinct control over strategic, theatre, and tactical missile assets
Enhance deterrence by providing a clear and credible conventional counterforce
Improve cost-effectiveness and doctrinal clarity by reducing redundancy and streamlining procurement and development
 
Jointness And Integration
 
The central question is whether an Indian rocket force would be a joint service organisation—mirroring the emerging “Theaterisation” reforms underway in the Indian armed forces. Under current considerations, the proposed IRF is envisioned as a tri-service command under the stewardship of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), likely headed operationally by a Lieutenant General-equivalent, integrating inputs and operational control from all three traditional services.
 
Tactical Vs Strategic Asset Control
 
Debate persists over the demarcation of missile assets: which missiles remain with the services for “tactical” use (e.g., Pinaka, short-range Prithvi), and which are delegated to the IRF for broader, theatre-level “strategic” effect (e.g., BrahMos, Pralay, BM-04). The Pralay missile, with its newly tested 500 km range and advanced maneuverability, and the next-generation BM-04 (up to 1,500 km), exemplify the blurring of lines between tactical and strategic systems. The Pinaka system itself is evolving, with new variants extending to 120 km and even a planned 300 km range, raising questions on classification and centralised control.
 
First Published: Jun 30 2025 | 1:24 PM IST

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