Signalling deterrence towards its adversaries, exhibiting “united front” tactics against Western countries and others, preparing to raise a “world class military”, displaying its defence technological advancements along with new equipment to woo countries for arms exports, and waging psychological warfare, China conducted a massive military parade on September 3 in Beijing.
Unlike India’s inclusive and annual Republic Day parade in New Delhi, which sees participation from states, institutions, and civil society across the country, the Beijing parade was confined to the 45 formations of the armed forces, indicating the rule of the army-party combine. Also, Beijing has witnessed only 17 military parades to date.
Historical debate
The parade was named as a “War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” 80 years ago to commemorate Japan’s official surrender in World War-II on September 2, 1945, after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings. This is the second “victory parade” after the 2015 event in Beijing. The conduct of such parades against Japan has evoked serious debates.
While an estimated 15 to 30 million casualties were reported during this “war of resistance” period, critiques pointed to “historical revisionism”: that while the Communist Party preserved its strength, it let the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) come directly under Japanese cross-fire in the 1930s and 1940s. They argued that millions more perished in China in the last several decades in political pogroms.
Secondly, Japan has contributed to China’s rise in terms of assistance, loans, investments, technology transfer, and managerial techniques. Bilateral trade between China and Japan was around $300 billion for the past decade and a half, while cumulative Japanese investment in China was more than $140 billion. More significantly, Japan’s Official Development Assistance to China — seen as a “compensation” for past events — contributed substantially to the emergence of China today.
Despite these, China organised the event that witnessed the participation of 26 world leaders. This indicates the rising Sino-Japanese differences, and possibly to upcoming sharp frictions on the Senkaku islands, the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea dispute, and others.
‘Between peace and war’
China’s President Xi Jinping, addressing the gathering at the parade ground, called on the armed forces to “provide strategic support for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Xi declared, “Humanity again has to choose between peace and war.” Clearly, this is designed to drum up support for the upcoming conflicts with the United States (US) and other countries. In China’s assessment, the US is a declining power, and under the Donald Trump administration, its economic, technological, or military dominance is said to be petering out. China’s leaders see this as an opportune moment to prepare and position for “great changes unseen in a century”. Many in China see themselves replacing the US as the global hegemon. While there are plenty such statements in China today, the parade provides an armed cover for these ambitions.
Arguably, the Beijing military parade served several Chinese objectives. The photo optics of 26 world leaders moving in unison at the parade, specifically Xi Jinping with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean supremo Kim Jong-un, definitely raised more than eyebrows in Western capitals. China had strived hard for displaying a “united front” against the West to protect its interests. US President Donald Trump commented that China might be conspiring against them.
By displaying 47 new military equipment out of the 100 mobilised at the parade, China is declaring that its defence industry’s advanced indigenisation efforts, free of dependence on Russia, Israel, and other countries for platforms. This is despite recently witnessing espionage cases related to sensitive technologies from the US and Russia involving Chinese citizens.
Earlier, Russia was a major supplier of arms to China. During the 1950s, the then Soviet Union transformed China’s military from “millets and rifles” to modernisation by transferring 41 major defence industries. Russian arms still form the backbone of China’s military, be it Type T-98 main battle tanks, Su-27 fighter aircraft (J-11), Yun-series transports, Sovremenny-class destroyers, Kilo-class submarines, S-400 ballistic missile defence systems, and others.
However, the Type T-100 main battle tanks at the Beijing parade reflect substantial indigenous efforts in modular design, turret, weapon platforms, laser-guided munitions, and satellite communications. This points to the transition between “mechanisation and informationisation”. Indigenous research and development are also visible in the airframe design of J-35 stealth aircraft, J-20 aircraft, Yun-20 transports, YJ-series of anti-ship hypersonic missiles, LY-1 laser weapons, HQ-16C and HQ-10A missile systems, the GJ-11 stealth drone, the AJX-002 submarine drone, and others. Specifically, China’s testing of hypersonic glide vehicles and their deployments recently can change course mid-flight by using next-generation target data processing and guidance technology.
In other words, China is sending signals that it is in the process of becoming less reliant on global arms suppliers, and this transition is sustainable in the long run.
Countering the West
While it is speculated that Russian inputs are visible in China’s hypersonic missile systems, however, China has clearly been able to develop hi-tech military platforms in recent years. Some attribute this to the success of scientific and technological breakthroughs, military-civil fusion of utilising civilian talent for upgradation, and the “thousand grains” project of inviting the Chinese researchers and students from Western universities by providing incentives to work in China.
Israel was also a major supplier of hi-tech military equipment to China, mostly surreptitiously, given the US’ end-user restrictions. The cancelled “Lavi” project of Israel is visible in China’s J-10 aircraft (which Pakistan deployed during the four-day conflict with India in May 2025). Likewise, the Python series of air-to-air missile variants. China’s drone technologies displayed at the parade also take a substantial cue from Israel. This dependence on Israeli technologies is despite China’s recent ranting on the Israel-Gaza-Iran conflict.
The latest Azerbaijan-Armenian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the Israel-Iran war all have placed a premium on drone warfare given its swiftness, affordability, endurance, intelligent control, stealth, and for diversified military usage and destructive capabilities. The Beijing parade display of advanced drones and the recent Chinese actions indicate their deployment of swarm tactics. China had also hinted at its adeptness in deploying micro-sensor swarms, micro-satellite constellations, ground robot swarms, underwater autonomous vehicle swarms, autonomous fire support systems, and intelligent cruise ammunition swarms, signalling to the potential adversaries of not only the costs involved but also pre-emptive conflict preparations.
Countering formidable rivals like the US and its allies requires robust strategic deterrence and power projection capabilities. The Beijing parade unveiled several weapons in this regard in the “nuclear triad”: DF-61 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, DF-5C (tested first in 2017), DF-26D, and a new JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The DF-5 series missiles, according to some Chinese commentators, are also to counter the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence ballistic missile system in South Korea.
Nevertheless, China’s nuclear capabilities have expanded substantially. The US revised its estimates of China’s nuclear warheads to above 600, while new silos identified in 2021 at Yumen and Hami in western China could accommodate hundreds of such warheads. Therefore, the expansion in fissile materials and stockpile in China’s inventory is heating up the nuclear debate. With China refusing to join any global “strategic arms reduction” talks, this issue is likely to stay in the limelight.
Command crisis
However, the issue of “man behind the machine” in most armed forces also haunts China. Behind the slick manoeuvres of the troops and equipment at the parade, the professionalism of the troops remains a major issue. The Chinese mention this as “contradiction between personnel and technology” in their writings. While China had reorganised the military colleges and universities to include Gulf War-related curriculum, professionalism is still an issue, also because of the Communist Party’s ever-increasing centralisation efforts that stultify local commanders' initiatives.
Another major problem emerging is that the command and control structures in China’s military are on the verge of collapse. Several top military leaders are under “investigation”: a euphemism for confinement, banishment from public, or even arrest and stripping of all posts. Under Xi Jinping, many high-level military leaders — initially to rival factions under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao but recently his own faction — faced marching orders.
These include the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairmen like Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, and He Weidong; CMC members like Miao Hua; Defence Ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe; Chief of Joint Staff Fang Fenghui; strategic rocket forces leaders Li Yuchao and Xu Zhongbo; and defence industry leaders Wu Yansheng, Liu Shiquan, and Wang Changqing. No armed force across the world has witnessed so many dismissals recently and in such an unprecedented manner. This is creating a void in the command and control structures of China’s armed forces.
Ambitions and limitations
The display of advanced military equipment at the military parade is in line with the ambitious road map of the 19th Communist Party Congress in October 2017. It laid down a three-stage programme for transforming the military. First, it wanted to create joint operational commands by developing five theatre commands by 2020, then complete the process of mechanisation and IT applications by 2035, and finally raise a world-class military force by 2049 (the hundredth year of the People’s Republic).
The parade is also in line with the recently held 20th Party Congress in 2022, which focussed excessively on national security. It stated that China should “effectively respond to grave, intricate international developments and a series of immense risks and challenges”. According to some Chinese commentators, the equipment displayed at the Beijing parade is undoubtedly “combat-ready” rather than for mere display.
While the Beijing parade involved multi-dimensional messaging to several quarters, and rising nationalism in China could further fuel such ambitions of the Communist Party and its armed forces, there are limitations to this process. China’s relative economic decline in the last decade, more specifically due to the US tariffs and technology denials, rising political protests, and factional struggles, has exposed the extent to which China can push forward its agenda.
Lack of military operational experience, after the disastrous Vietnam War in 1979, is telling on China’s armed forces. For instance, while China touted its J-10 fighter aircraft used by Pakistan against India in May 2025, other equipment supplied to Pakistan such as the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile systems, the Wing Loong III drone, and the JF-17 aircraft performed miserably. So, even as China flashed new gadgets at the parade, it is clear that many of its equipment have either underperformed or are below the operational expectations.
(The author is professor, China studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal)
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 "Mega parade showcases China's global ambitions")
