'The India-Pakistan hyphen disappeared in 1999 and hasn't returned'

With time having clarified much of the disinformation surrounding Operation Sindoor, and early analyses now exhausted, India’s last High Commissioner to Pakistan and later envoy to Canada, Ajay Bisaria, speaks about apprehensions of an India-Pakistan rehyphenation, the role diplomacy can play in cementing battlefield gains, and what might lie ahead with China. 

With Operation Sindoor paused, who emerged as winners and losers?

This conflict played out across three domains: military foremost but also diplomatic and informational. In the military domain, India clearly had a battlefield advantage and dominated not just the conflict itself but also the escalation ladder. At each stage, India pushed the battle up a rung, then offered an off-ramp for de-escalation, which Pakistan eventually took on May 10. It was an overwhelming military victory for India, despite Pakistan also claiming victory, as it always does. Anything short of a crushing defeat is portrayed by Pakistan as success. In the diplomatic domain, India’s strategy worked well. Military action drove the engagement, while diplomacy supported and facilitated a kinetic response to cross-border terror. India gained significant global traction from the outset first in terms of support for punishing terrorism, and later for its cross-border kinetic action deep into another country’s territory. The only global caveat was the call to de-escalate after escalation. Post-conflict diplomacy is now visible through all-party delegations. In the information domain, the outcome is more clouded. India arguably underperformed, as Pakistan typically seizes the advantage of the first lie rushing into the information space with disinformation, while India waits for verification. Compounding this was the poor performance of Indian electronic media, which spread incorrect information. This highlights the need to strengthen strategic communication and war reporting.

Apprehensions have emerged in India that it has been re-hyphenated with Pakistan, and that Kashmir has been internationalised...

Neither of these concerns hyphenation or internationalisation have materialised. That was early, lazy analysis. The US role here was no different from its position after the 2019 Balakot airstrike. The only change is Trump 2.0, a different figure from Trump 1.0 who was in office in 2019. The outcome clearly stemmed from India’s military pressure on Pakistan, especially on the night of May 9–10, which forced Pakistan to climb down there’s no doubt about that. What’s different now is that Trump’s social media post appeared around 5:35 pm, before Pakistan claimed a ceasefire and well before India’s official announcement. This reflects Trump’s tendency not necessarily his administration’s to insert himself into situations and claim quick victories, especially when there was no breakthrough in Gaza, Ukraine, or with China on tariffs. This seemed like a 

low-hanging fruit. At that point, Trump did not represent the official US position, or even that of his own administration. It was simply Trump being Trump. Policy circles recognised this, which is why there was no serious pushback just a reiteration of India’s position that the pause was the result of a bilateral agreement. Other global actors, including Saudi Arabia, may have reinforced India’s message to Pakistan and acted as supplementary channels but certainly not the primary one. The same happened in 2019, though without public credit-claiming. On the broader point of hyphenation: The India–Pakistan hyphen disappeared in 1999 and hasn’t returned. Media mentions of both countries in the same breath don’t amount to hyphenation. A hyphen implies the false equivalence common in the 1990s. That ended on July 4, 1999, when President Clinton summoned Nawaz Sharif to the White House and backed India’s coercive diplomacy, telling him to withdraw from Kargil or face consequences. Since then, given the trajectory of India–US ties, the hyphen has remained absent. Washington understands the difference between a $300 billion economy and a $4 trillion one; between a responsible democracy and a state that exports terrorism. That distinction is clear in US thinking and not just in Washington, but across the West. As for internationalisation, this isn’t about Kashmir it’s about terrorism. India’s delegations abroad are focused on communicating the new normal: Zero tolerance for terrorism. Their message is that Pakistan’s actions must be addressed collectively.

What are the all-party delegations visiting 32 countries aiming for?

First, the delegations aim to convey India’s evolving position of zero tolerance towards terrorism, treating it as an act of war, and to build global understanding especially at the UN Security Council on the need to corner Pakistan on this issue. They will also press for renewed activism on placing Pakistan back on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list, possibly advocate for FATF-like conditions in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and even suggest sanctions on individual members of the Pakistan Army. These will be among the key points Indian delegates raise. Second, the visits are an opportunity to counter Pakistan’s propaganda. As a garrison state, Pakistan pushes alternative narratives that, while lacking credibility, can gain traction if left unchallenged. It is important to rebut these in global forums where repetition can lend them undue legitimacy. Third, the delegations will amplify India’s diplomatic messaging by promoting the India story. For global investors and governments, this centres on India’s aim to sustain 6–8 per cent growth as part of its strategic goal to become a developed economy by 2047. This includes highlighting India’s capacity to manage security challenges without being drawn into prolonged conflicts unlike Putin or Netanyahu. India’s swift, controlled response to Pakistan,and its measured yet resolute stance during the Line of Actual Control (LAC) standoff with China, demonstrated its ability to tackle threats firmly while staying focused on its core mission: Economic growth through reform and global partnerships.

With Operation Sindoor establishing a new normal, what space do you see for diplomacy with Pakistan?

China will remain India’s central strategic challenge for perhaps the next three decades. However, India should not adopt a policy of strategic neglect towards Pakistan, which will continue to be its primary counterterrorism challenge in the short and medium term. This is a reality we must acknowledge and address whether through global diplomacy by highlighting the nature of the Pakistani state, or through direct engagement. We have already engaged with Pakistan to reach a military agreement to pause hostilities, and that itself justifies more robust military-to-military communication. This would allow India to directly communicate its red lines and ensure they are factored into Pakistan’s strategic calculus. So there is a case for direct engagement with Pakistan, limited to clearly conveying India’s red lines on terrorism. I would further argue that dialogue with the Pakistan military should begin not only as a crisis communication channel, but also to articulate India’s position clearly, including on the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). India’s position is not to abrogate the treaty, but to perhaps renegotiate it on its terms. Therefore, there is a case for eventual dialogue on the IWT as well making clear that the future flow of waters can be calibrated according to Pakistan’s behaviour on terrorism.

How do you assess the state of the neighbourhood?

I would distinguish between China’s military and diplomatic positions. What we saw was a unique battlefield unlike anything previously witnessed between India and Pakistan, especially in a nuclear environment. It was high-tech and collusive: 80 per cent of the equipment was Chinese, 20 per cent Turkish, placing China directly on the battlefield in terms of both offensive and defensive hardware. India’s military planners will now factor in the possibility of an even more collusive, perhaps unified, front in future conflicts. However low the probability, such a scenario must be considered as a potential battlefield of the future. The Pakistanis will likely turn to China for more advanced equipment, and I expect the new Field Marshal to visit Beijing soon with such a request. 

On the diplomatic front, China’s role was limited. It provided Pakistan only the bare minimum support whether at the UN or in broader diplomacy.The Chinese were calling for restraint on both sides, and the Chinese foreign minister was in touch with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar. China did not appear inclined to expend significant political capital defending terrorism, as it felt compelled to do in 2019 when it placed a technical hold on listing a Pakistan-based terrorist. China dislikes doing this but acts when it feels obliged to support its client state. So its position here was nuanced. Beyond adversaries China and Pakistan, and failing states Afghanistan and Myanmar, the rest of the region consists of countries at various stages of balancing ties between India and China, with regimes that shift in orientation. India has deep-rooted equities in Bangladesh that will outlast the current regime.